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Abstract: 1 in 7 Americans received assistance from SNAP in FY2012, which is a rate 141 
percent higher than in FY2000, but only 59 percent higher than in FY1980.  In this chapter I 
describe the socioeconomic and policy climate in recent decades that had bearing on SNAP 
participation, along with a formal empirical analysis of those determinants and detailed 
simulations of the relative contributions of the economy, policy, and demographics to changes in 
SNAP participation over time.  The results suggest that SNAP is operating effectively as an 
automatic fiscal stabilizer—nearly 50 percent of the increase in participation from 2007-2011 is 
due to the weak economy—but policy reforms expanding access and benefit generosity also 
affected participation, accounting for nearly 30 percent of the increase after the Great Recession.  
The changing demographics of the American household are helping restrain growth in SNAP.  
 
 
 
 
* I thank Sarah Burns and Robert Paul Hartley for excellent research assistance, and for 
comments by Jonathan Schwabish, Tim Smeeding, and participants at the UKCPR/IRP 
Conference Five Decades of Food Stamps on an earlier version.  The opinions expressed are 
solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of any sponsoring agency.
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 Since its inception fifty years ago, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(SNAP) has become a central component of the social safety net in the United States.  The 
program is unique in its status as something akin to a universal entitlement; that is, subject to 
meeting low-income and asset tests, the program does not impose restrictions on eligibility based 
on age (Social Security), family structure (Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, TANF), or 
work history (Disability Insurance and Unemployment Insurance). Today, 1 in 7 Americans 
receive assistance from SNAP at a cost approaching $80 billion in FY2012, making it the second 
largest means-tested transfer in terms of cost after Medicaid.  For much of its first three decades 
SNAP operated in the shadows of the safety net, both in terms of a policy or research interest, 
especially in comparison to politically contentious programs like TANF and more expensive 
programs like Medicaid.  What has caught the attention of policymakers and researchers alike in 
recent years is the rapid growth of the program. Since FY2000, the number participating has 
increased 171 percent and inflation-adjusted spending by 286 percent.1  This has led to calls for 
programmatic reforms, ranging from the 2013 House Bill H.R. 3102 that would cut $39 billion 
over the next decade to wholesale decentralization in the form of a block grant to states with 
additional work requirements similar to TANF (Secretaries Innovation Group 2013).   
The aim of this chapter is to document the factors underlying the evolution of program 
participation since 1980.2  I emphasize three major points in my analysis: changes in the 
macroeconomy, both cyclical forces from the labor market and secular trends in income 
                                                 
1 Author’s calculations based on administrative SNAP data at http://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/SNAPsummary.htm and 
the personal consumption expenditure deflator (Table B-7 of the 2013 Economic Report of the President 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/erp2013/ERP2013_Appendix_B.pdf ). 
2 Prior to the Food Stamp Act of 1977, which was implemented in 1979, recipients of assistance faced a so-called 
purchase requirement, meaning that they were required to spend up to their normal expenditure on food to buy 
stamps, and then to receive a “bonus” amount of stamps based on income level to bring their food spending up to the 
level of the USDA low-cost diet. Because many low-income families face binding liquidity constraints and were 
unable to purchase stamps up front, the purchase requirement was believed to have artificially depressed 
participation (Caswell and Yaktine 2013).  Thus I focus on the period after the 1977 Act. 
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inequality; changes in public policies, both food and nonfood related; and shifting demographics 
of the American household.  I begin by describing the socioeconomic and policy climate in 
recent decades that had bearing on SNAP participation, followed by a formal empirical analysis 
of those determinants and detailed simulations of the relative contributions of the economy, 
policy, and demographics to changes in SNAP participation over time.3  
THE ECONOMY 
The rush to cut or reform SNAP may be misplaced if growth in the program is primarily 
due to the weak labor market and economy over the past decade.  There is extensive research 
evidence that SNAP functions effectively as an automatic fiscal stabilizer, meaning that as the 
economy and market incomes fall during recessions participation in SNAP “automatically” rises 
to smooth consumption and as market incomes rise during economic expansions participation 
falls (Wallace and Blank 1999; Blundell and Pistaferri 2003; Gundersen and Ziliak 2003; Ziliak, 
et al. 2003; Bitler and Hoynes 2010; Klerman and Danielson 2011; Ganong and Liebman 2013).  
This suggests that as the macroeconomy improves in coming years, participation and cost of 
SNAP will decline.  Indeed, assuming no changes in law, the Congressional Budget Office 
(2012) projected that by 2022 spending on SNAP would fall 23 percent because of improving 
labor market conditions. 
That such a countercyclical link exists seems transparent in Figure 1, which depicts 
trends in aggregate SNAP participation and seasonally-adjusted unemployment rates.4 
                                                 
3 I do not cover issues related to process implementation of SNAP reforms, which may have also affected the 
caseload over the past decade.  See, for example, Rowe, et al. (2010) and Hurley, et al. (2013).  
4 Unless noted otherwise, all data come from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current 
Population Survey for calendar years 1980-2011.  In the CPS all persons in a household are assigned as a SNAP 
recipient even if only a subset receives benefits.  The assumption is that members of households pool resources, so 
even though not all members are direct beneficiaries, indirectly they do benefit from extra resources. This will 
overstate actual participation, but this is weighed against evidence of under-reporting of SNAP receipt in household 
surveys (Bollinger and David 1997; Wheaton 2007; Meyer and Goerge 2011). It also misses the fact that a 
household may consist of multiple SNAP units. The appendix describes the data and elaborates on these issues. 
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Highlighted in the figure are years that include a macroeconomic recession as defined by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research.  It is clear that peaks in SNAP usage coincide (perhaps 
with a lag) with peaks in unemployment rates over the past three decades. A simple time-series 
regression of SNAP participation on the unemployment rate and a linear trend yields: 
𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃� 𝑡 =
3.47
(1.03) +
0.86
(0.13) ∗ 𝑈𝑅𝑡 +
0.01
(0.02) ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑,𝑅
2 = 0.57,   (1) 
where standard errors are reported in parentheses.  The r-squared of 0.57 says that 
unemployment rates explain nearly 60 percent of the variation in aggregate SNAP participation 
(the trend adds nothing to the model).  The coefficient on the unemployment rates implies that 
for each percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, SNAP increases by 0.86 points, or 
almost 10 percent on the average SNAP participation rate of 9.2 percent over the 1980 to 2011 
period.  While this time-series model is simply illustrative, a robust link between the business 
cycle and SNAP participation remains even in a more fully specified model as estimated below.    
[Figures 1 and 2 here] 
Concomitant with large swings in unemployment rates, there has also been a sizable 
secular shift in the distribution of earnings and income that may bear on SNAP participation in 
recent decades (Piketty and Saez 2003; Autor, et al. 2008; Burkhauser, et al. 2012).  Figure 2 
depicts trends in real median household income as well as the ratio of the 90th percentile of real 
income to the 10th percentile of real income.  The median is a robust measure of the center of a 
skewed distribution such as income that is used to signify how the “typical” household is faring, 
and the 90-10 ratio is a standard measure of inequality.  Since 1980 real median income has 
increased 22 percent to $52,000, while 90-10 inequality increased 30 percent.  However, unlike 
the expansions of the 1980s and 1990s, which each had peaks in income in excess of the prior 
cycle, median income at the peak of the 2000s cycle was no greater than the 1990s, and in fact 
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by 2011 any gains in median income since 1999 were lost. The flattening out of median income 
from 2000 to 2007, followed by a sharp decline in the Great Recession, coincides with a sharp 
increase in income inequality.  The latter was driven both by continued increases in income at 
the top, coupled with significant declines in income at the bottom of the distribution. 
POLICY REFORMS 
Basic eligibility for SNAP benefits is determined by having monthly gross income below 
130 percent of the poverty guideline for a given household size and monthly net income (gross 
income less deductions) may not exceed 100 percent of that guideline (households with an 
elderly or disabled person are exempt from the gross income test). The guideline is the same for 
the 48 lower contiguous states and the District of Columbia, and slightly higher for residents of 
Alaska and Hawaii.  If net income is zero then the recipient qualifies for the maximum benefit, 
which likewise varies by the size of the SNAP household but is the same nationally except for 
Alaska and Hawaii.  If net income is positive then the monthly benefit is reduced by 30 percent 
for every dollar of net income because the household is expected to contribute up to 30 percent 
of their other income to food. Generally benefits were set at 100 percent of the Thrifty Food Plan 
(TFP) and increased annually based on changes in the price of food used in constructing the TFP, 
though there were deviations from this from 1988-1996 when they were set at 103 percent of the 
TFP, and again since 2009 when they were set at 113.6 percent of the TFP and not adjusted for 
inflation afterwards.  Currently the minimum monthly benefit is $16, though for much of the past 
few decades it was $10.  In addition to the two income tests there is both a liquid asset test of 
$2,000 ($3,250 for households with a disabled person or someone age 60 or older) and a vehicle 
value test of $4,650, although as noted below several states have raised or waived asset and 
vehicle tests.  Historically federal law required recipients to recertify for benefits at least 
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annually (sooner if there was a change in household or income status) and every two years if the 
household contained a disabled person or a senior, although there was the option for states to 
assign shorter recertification periods (Kabbani and Wilde 2003).  The other path to participation 
is through “categorical eligibility,” which typically applies to TANF and SSI recipients who 
automatically qualify for SNAP. 
There was little change in basic eligibility rules in the nearly two decades leading up to 
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA, aka 
welfare reform).  Welfare reform, however, had both a direct and indirect policy effect on SNAP.  
Directly, it eliminated eligibility for most legal permanent aliens unless they had at least 10 years 
of work experience or were veterans; it eliminated benefits for convicted drug felons; it limited 
benefits to three months out of any 36-month period for able-bodied adults without dependents 
(ABAWDS) between the ages of 18 and 50 working less than 20 hours per week or not meeting 
other work requirements; it reduced the maximum benefit and froze many deductions used in 
calculating net income; it allowed states to sanction individuals and households for 
noncompliance with TANF requirements or child support payments; and it mandated that states 
adopt the Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) replacing paper coupons with debit cards (Gabor 
and Botsko 1998; Gleason, et a. 2001).  Indirectly participation was affected by virtue of the fact 
that half of the food stamp caseload was categorically eligible for stamps via their receipt of 
TANF benefits, and as welfare reform pulled people off of TANF they also dropped receipt of 
food stamps, at least temporarily (Ziliak, et al. 2003).  The other policy change that indirectly 
affected SNAP, even prior to welfare reform (note that in Figure 1 participation started to fall 
three years before PRWORA), was the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
6 
 
starting in 1993 that pulled scores of single mothers into the labor force, and off welfare and food 
stamps (Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001).   
As participation in SNAP plummeted over 40 percent from 1993 to 2000, so too did the 
take-up rate of benefits; that is, the fraction of eligible persons participating fell over 25 percent 
to just over 50 percent (Leftin, et al. 2011).  A decline in participation does not have to be 
associated with a decline in take-up because the decline in participation could occur only among 
those no longer eligible.  Take-up rates among eligible seniors has always been low (30-35 
percent depending on year), and the decline in take-up after 1993 was driven mainly by children 
and nonelderly adults (Cunnyngham 2002).  The fall in take-up, which is likely a spillover effect 
of former TANF recipients also leaving food stamps even though they remained eligible, was 
met with alarm (and controversy) in policy circles.  
In response several new initiatives aimed at program outreach and eligibility expansion 
were introduced, and in some cases codified in the Farm Bills of 2002 and 2008, giving much 
more discretion to the states to improve take-up and program administration.5  These included 
liberalizing vehicle asset tests, such as exempting one or more vehicles from the test; expanding 
(broad-based) categorical eligibility, which allowed states to utilize more generous TANF asset 
and gross-income tests to determine eligibility; restoring eligibility for legal aliens previously 
excluded by PRWORA; expanding the option for simplified reporting, which allowed states to 
relax the frequency and form (i.e. phone or online) of benefit recertification; and outreach via 
advertising campaigns.6  Not all of the reforms were intended to make access easier.  
Specifically in the 1990s states responded to financial incentives offered by USDA to reduce 
                                                 
5 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) also affected SNAP by raising the maximum 
benefit guarantee by an average of 13.6 percent, raising the minimum benefit from $14 to $16, and suspending the 
time limit of receipt among ABAWDs (http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-nutrition-assistance/supplemental-
nutrition-assistance-program-(snap)/arra.aspx#.Uh3u6Rtebmc ). 
6 See http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/applicant_recipients/eligibility.htm  
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benefit error rates by requiring more frequent certification, especially in households with 
workers, such that by 2000 36 percent of working households faced 3 month or less 
recertification intervals, up from 4.7 percent in 1992 (Kabbani and Wilde 2003).  Some of the 
simplified reporting requirements adopted in recent years were intended to offset the hardship 
associated with more frequent certification.  Another policy that restricted access is fingerprint 
imaging and facial recognition software. 
[Table 1 here] 
Table 1 summarizes changes in the number of states (and DC) adopting various SNAP 
policy options between 2000 and 2011 based on information in the Economic Research Service’s 
SNAP Policy Database.7  By 2011 41 states implemented broad-based categorical eligibility as a 
mechanism to join SNAP, compared to only 2 states in 2000, and of those 41 states 38 elected to 
eliminate the SNAP liquid asset test as part of broad-based eligibility.  The number of states 
offering call centers, phone applications, and combined application processes with other transfer 
programs has exploded, along with the number offering simplified reporting and exempting 
vehicle assets. As of 2011 49 states utilized simplified reporting, and 45 states exempt all vehicle 
assets from resources in determining eligibility for SNAP. At the same time, states pulled back 
from imposing short recertification windows of 1-3 months, and restored SNAP eligibility to 
more noncitizens, especially children. 
In the aftermath of the 1996 welfare reform there was a flurry of research focused on 
understanding the relative roles of the macroeconomy and policy on declining food stamp 
caseloads.  Wallace and Blank (1999) attributed about 44 percent of the decline to the 
strengthening economy, and about 6 percent to welfare reform.  Figlio, Gundersen, and Ziliak 
                                                 
7 SNAP Policy Database, Economic Research Service, USDA http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/snap-policy-
database.aspx#.Uh3oARtebmc . 
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(2000) reached similar conclusions in terms of the role of the economy, but ascribed a negligible 
role to welfare reform.  Gleason, et al. (2001) found that 47 percent of the decline was due to the 
economy, and about 26 percent to welfare reform. And in a recent re-evaluation of that period 
Klerman and Danielson (2011) found that 31 percent of the 1994-2000 decline resulted from 
lower unemployment rates and about 13 percent from welfare reform.  In short, the consensus 
was that the economy mattered by a factor of 2 to 3 more than policy for the latter 1990s decline 
in food stamps.  
 Additionally several studies have examined various aspects of specific food policy 
reforms on SNAP caseloads, both for the 1990s and 2000s (Figlio, et al. 2000; Gleason, et al. 
2001; Ziliak, et al. 2003; Kabbani and Wilde 2003; Bartlett, et al. 2004; Ratcliffe, et al. 2007; 
Burstein, et al. 2009; Mabli and Ferrerosa 2010; Klerman and Danielson 2011; Dickert-Conlin, 
et al. 2011; Ganong and Liebman 2013).  There seems to be some consensus that short 
recertification periods reduced SNAP participation in the 1990s, and that broad-based categorical 
eligibility and simplified reporting led to higher caseloads.  There is limited evidence that 
expanded outreach leads to higher caseloads (Dickert-Conlin et al. 2011), while fingerprinting 
results in lower caseloads (Burstein, et al. 2004; Ratcliffe, et al. 2007).  The evidence is 
decidedly mixed whether the introduction of the EBT, allowing ABAWD waivers, or vehicle 
asset expansions have affected caseloads. 
 A few recent studies have updated the 1990s economy versus policy debate to identify 
the relative contributions of each to understanding the post-2000 increase in SNAP participation.  
Mabli and Ferrerosa (2010), focusing on 2000 to 2008, ascribe 55 percent of the increase in 
SNAP to economic factors and 20 percent to the food policy reforms.  Klerman and Danielson 
(2011) find a much lower effect of the economy of 27 percent of the caseload increase from 2000 
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to 2009, and 16 percent to food policy and 6 percent to welfare reform. Ganong and Leibman 
(2013), zeroing in on the post Great Recession increase in SNAP from 2007-2011, attribute 
about two-thirds of the growth to the weak economy and about 7.6 percent to food policy 
changes.  Mulligan (2012), on the other hand, argues that just over 20 percent of the increase was 
due to expanded policy, and Mulligan (2013) finds that two-thirds of the $122 increase in 
spending per capita from 2007-2011 was due to the increased generosity of SNAP benefits and 
related policies like broad-based categorical eligibility.  Thus, unlike the 1990s decline, there is 
less consensus on whether the economy or policy drove the increase in participation in the 2000s.  
CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS 
There have been important demographic shifts in the U.S. population over the past 
several decades that could differentially affect the size of the SNAP caseload, participation rates 
among subpopulations, and the attendant composition of the caseload.  On the one hand, the 
aging of the population suggests that the composition of the caseload should be aging as well. 
However, because take-up rates among seniors are so much lower than adults and children, this 
should put downward pressure on the growth of the caseload and thus it is not clear a priori 
whether the age distribution of the caseload is likely to change due to population aging. Indeed, 
because of the decline in marriage the fraction of births to unwed mothers accelerated from 15 
percent of live births in 1980 to 40 percent by the mid 2000s (Cancian and Reed 2009; Carlson 
and England 2011), and as single mother families are more likely to be poor, then it is entirely 
possible that the caseload could be getting larger and younger at the same time. A similar trend 
toward a younger, larger caseload could emerge from the growth of the Hispanic population, 
who all else equal tend to be younger, lower income, and with larger family sizes (Landale, et al. 
2006).  Another secular trend placing upward pressure on the size of the SNAP caseload is the 
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significant growth of disability, both in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Social 
Security Disability Income (SSDI) programs (Muller, et al. 2006; Autor 2011).  Households in 
which all residents receive SSI automatically qualify for SNAP, but SSDI households and those 
SSI units where some receive disability and others do not still must meet income and asset 
restrictions. 
[Figures 3 and 4 here] 
Figure 3 presents trends in the age composition of households receiving SNAP for 
children under age 18, for adults age 18 to 59, and for seniors age 60 and older.  The age 60 
threshold for seniors is consistent with SNAP policy for eligibility determination.  The figure 
shows that in any given year the participation rate among children is double the rate of adults, 
and triple that of seniors.  However, the decline in participation among children and adults 
during the welfare era (1993-2000) was substantially higher than among the elderly (46 and 48 
percent, respectively, compared to 30 percent), but the subsequent growth from 2000-2011 was 
also higher for those two groups compared to the elderly (95, 138, and 75 percent, respectively).  
Combined, in Figure 4 these changes over the past decade have resulted in a shift in the age 
composition of households receiving SNAP away from children and elderly and toward adults.  
In all years prior to the Great Recession about 55 percent of SNAP households consisted of 
children and the elderly, but by 2009, a slim majority were nonelderly adults.8   
Coincident with the shift in the age composition of households with SNAP is the shift in 
the composition towards smaller households and those with multi-generations.  Figure 5 shows 
that beginning in the welfare reform era there has been a secular decline in the fraction of SNAP 
                                                 
8 It is important to recall that the definition of a SNAP household in the CPS differs from the SNAP unit in SNAP 
Quality Control Data. In the former a household includes recipients and nonrecipients, but in the latter it is only 
recipients.  As a consequence, in QC data a majority of recipients are still children and the elderly (54 percent in 
2011 (Strayer, et al. 2012).  
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households containing 3 or more persons, and a rise in the fraction of 1-person and 2-person 
SNAP households.  At the same time, households receiving SNAP, like the general population, 
are increasingly likely to contain multiple generations as seen in Figure 6.9 A multi-generation 
household is one that contains two or more adult generations, with or without a grandchild, or a 
grandparent and grandchild household (“skipped generations”).  The upward pressure in multi-
generation households stems more from the addition of adults to the household than children, 
which is consistent with the trend toward more 2-person SNAP households. 
[Figures 5 and 6 here] 
A possible concern with the shift toward smaller, prime-age adult households is that it 
may coincide with an increasing fraction of the SNAP caseload headed by individuals out of the 
labor force. A more welfare-only reliant population could affect public support for SNAP in light 
of the centrality of work requirements and time limits that fundamentally altered the TANF 
program during welfare reform (Ziliak 2009).  In fact, Figure 7 shows that the share of SNAP 
households headed by a person out of the labor force has been very stable for the past two 
decades, averaging about 53 percent.  The growth has been most rapid among full-time, full-year 
workers, as well as part-time, full-years workers.  In other words, the heads of an increasing 
share of SNAP households have a very strong attachment to the labor force.  Furthermore, Figure 
8 shows that the fraction SNAP households headed by a high school dropout has plummeted  by 
more than half to under 30 percent since 1980, and by 2011 more than a third of SNAP 
households were headed by someone with some college or more.10  Figure 9, which depicts the 
distribution of SNAP households by household income in relation to the federal poverty 
                                                 
9 Beginning in 1988 the CPS adopted an improved method of identifying grandchildren and grandparents in 
households, and thus the jump after 1987 reflects the change in survey design. 
10 The CPS changed the measurement of education attainment after calendar year 1990 and thus the jump in some 
college in the two years after owes in part to the change in the questionnaire. 
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guideline given the household size, shows that since the mid 1980s the composition of SNAP 
households has trended toward those with annual incomes above the poverty line.  This suggests 
that SNAP has evolved into a work supplement for educated, near-poor households. 
[Figures 7-9 here] 
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: ACCOUNTING FOR THE RISE IN SNAP 
I now re-examine in a more formal setting the relative roles of the economy and policy 
(food and non-food) in accounting for SNAP participation over time, and in a new twist I also 
isolate the contribution of changing demographics.  The empirical framework is the standard 
reduced-form setup as 
𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝑍𝑗𝑡𝛿 + 𝜋𝑗 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡,      (2) 
where 𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 is an indicator equal to 1 if anyone in household i residing in state j in time t 
receives SNAP, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of household demographics, 𝑍𝑗𝑡 is a vector of state by year 
economic and policy variables, 𝜋𝑗 is a set of indicators for each state, 𝜑𝑡 is a set of indicators for 
each year, and 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a random error term.  For the model I restrict attention to the household 
head, and thus do not include multiple observations from the same family.  I estimate equation 
(2) via least squares, which means the linear probability standard errors must be corrected for 
heteroskedasticity.  In addition, since much of the focus is on the economic and policy variables 
at the state level, I also cluster the standard errors by state to account for the within-state 
autocorrelation arising from the fact that multiple households are present in each state.11 
The demographic controls include indicators for the head’s age (over age 75 is the 
omitted group), education attainment (relative to high school dropout), race (relative to white), 
                                                 
11 In results not tabulated I also estimated the standard errors that clustered both by state and year as suggested by 
Cameron, et al. (2011).  The standard errors were little changed, but there were violations of full column rank in the 
variance matrix so I only report results that cluster at the state level. 
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Hispanic ethnicity, household size, number of related children under age 18, and indicators 
whether the household is multigenerational, headed by a woman, headed by a married person, or 
residing in a metro area. Because participation is means-tested I do not include household 
earnings or non-SNAP income in the demographics to avoid potential endogeneity.    
The measures of the macroeconomy that vary by state and year include the 
unemployment rate, real median household income, and the ratio of 90/10 real income. Given the 
apparent lag in SNAP participation to changes in unemployment in Figure 1, in some of the 
specifications I allow a two-year lag in state unemployment rates (Figlio, et al 2000; Klerman 
and Danielson 2011; Ganong and Liebman 2013).12   
The non-food policy variables include the real value of the maximum of the Federal or 
state minimum wage in a given year, the phase-in subsidy rate for the EITC, an indicator variable 
if the state has a separate EITC program, an indicator if the state ever implemented a federally-
approved waiver from its AFDC program between 1992 and 1996, and an indicator for when the 
state implemented its TANF program.  Because some state’s set their minimum wage above the 
Federal wage and others below, I use the maximum of the two as a proxy for wage incentives to 
work.  Thus, a higher minimum wage is expected to lower participation. The EITC subsidy rate, 
since it makes work relatively more attractive, is expected also to lower participation. The same 
is true of a state’s EITC supplement.  Even though it is set nationally, the EITC subsidy rate is 
identified by the fact that it varies over time and by the number of qualifying children (Hotz and 
Scholz 2003).13  While some of the waiver and TANF policies were designed to make it more 
attractive to combine welfare and work, e.g. higher earnings disregards and asset limits, on net 
                                                 
12 In an earlier version I also examined whether the effect of the economy on SNAP participation differed across 
decades.  There was some evidence that unemployment had a larger effect in the 1990s than the 1980s, but there was 
no difference from the 2000s. These estimates are available upon request. 
13 The CPS does not document whether a child in the household qualifies for the EITC, and thus I proxy this by the 
number of related children under age 18. 
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most of the policies made AFDC/TANF participation less attractive and thus both the AFDC 
waiver and TANF indicators are expected to lower participation in SNAP.  
For the SNAP policy variables I assign the real maximum benefit guarantee for a 1, 2, 3, 
or 4 person household based on family size (the 4-person guarantee is assigned to households 
with 4 or more persons) to measure the financial generosity of the program. Thus, the higher the 
guarantee the higher is the expected participation in SNAP. Like the EITC subsidy rate, the 
SNAP benefit is identified in the model because it varies over time and by household size.14  For 
the remaining SNAP variables I utilize the SNAP Policy Database assembled by the Economic 
Research Service in the U.S. Department of Agriculture. These variables, which vary across 
states and time, include the fraction of SNAP dollars redeemed via the EBT, indicators for 
whether the state allows broad-based categorical eligibility, whether the state operates call 
centers (either statewide or partial state), whether the state allows combined SSI/SNAP 
applications, whether it imposes short recertification periods of 3 months or less for households 
with a working member, whether noncitizens are eligible for benefits, whether the household 
must be fingerprinted (either statewide or partial state), whether the household is disqualified for 
being sanctioned by another program such as TANF, whether the state allows online applications 
(either statewide or partial state), whether the state adopted simplified reporting, whether it 
excludes the full value of a vehicle for eligibility, and the real spending on outreach.  The 
expected signs on these variables are all intuitive, and reflect the series of carrots and sticks that 
states have adopted in administering their SNAP programs.  Finally, to proxy for state variation 
in politics, I include an indicator variable whether the governor of the state is a Democrat, and 
                                                 
14 As discussed earlier the maximum benefit is generally tied to inflation of the food prices in the TFP, but the 
benefit also deviated from the TFP between 1988 and 1996, and from 2009-2011, providing non-inflation policy 
variation for identification. 
15 
 
expect the sign on the coefficient to be positive suggesting that Democratic governors create 
policy environment more support of SNAP participation.15   
[Table 2 here] 
 Table 2 presents linear probability estimates of the effect of the economy, policy, and 
demographics on SNAP household participation weighted by the CPS ASEC household weight.  
In column (1) the only measure of the economy is the state unemployment rate, where the 
estimate of 0.41 says that a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate leads to a 
0.41 point increase in SNAP participation, or about 5.3 percent on the average SNAP household 
participation rate of 7.6 percent from 1980-2011. This effect of unemployment is about one-half 
the size from the time-series regression reported in equation (1), indicating that the time-series 
model attributed too much to the economy once one controls for policy and demographics in the 
pooled cross-sectional models of equation (2).16  In column (2) when we add controls for state 
median income and income inequality the effect of the business cycle is attenuated by about 27 
percent, although once we admit a two-year lagged effect of the unemployment rate in column 
(3) the total effect of the business cycle of 0.38 points nearly returns to the baseline estimate.  
Columns (2) and (3) show that increases in the real median income lead to modest reductions in 
SNAP participation, while increases in inequality lead to more economically substantive 
increases. A unit increase in inequality leads to a 0.26 point increase in SNAP participation.  
The next panel of Table 2 contains the estimates of the nonfood policy variables.  
Expansions of the EITC subsidy rate over the past 30 years had an economically and statistically 
important disincentive effect on SNAP participation—each percentage point increase in the 
                                                 
15 Although the District of Columbia is not a state and has no governor, I set the governor is a Democrat variable to 
1 for all years for DC residents based on past voting of residents for local government. 
16 The average SNAP participation rates differ between equations (1) and (2) because in the former the outcome is 
persons participating and in the latter it is households. 
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subsidy rate reduces SNAP participation by 0.1 points, or about 1.3 percent at the mean level of 
SNAP usage. Given the 20 percentage point increase in the subsidy rate for 2 qualifying children 
in the mid 1990s suggests that increased EITC generosity had a substantive effect on reductions 
in SNAP during that period.  SNAP participation, holding other factors constant, is at least a 
percentage point lower after implementation of TANF, suggesting an important spillover effect 
of welfare reform onto the SNAP caseload. 
The third panel of Table 2 presents estimates of the food policy variables.  Each $100 
increase in the real maximum benefit guarantee leads to a 1.9 point increase.  Evaluated at the 
means of the data the elasticity of SNAP participation with respect to the benefit guarantee is 
0.88, which means that the 13.6 percent increase in benefits as part of ARRA is expected to 
increase participation 12.2 percent.17 On the converse, with the expiration of the ARRA benefit 
increase in October 2013, participation is expected to fall by the same magnitude. Across the 
various other policy variables only a few have a consistent economic and statistical effect on 
participation.  Broad-based categorical eligibility and simplified reporting are each associated 
with increases in SNAP participation.  States that have adopted these policies have SNAP 
participation rates that are 0.6 and 0.8 points higher, respectively.  At the same time, if the state 
requires fingerprinting of its recipients then participation is about 0.7 points lower (columns 2 
and 3). Outreach spending has the unexpected sign of reducing participation, though the 
magnitude is very small.18 
                                                 
17 As a comparison, Nord and Prell (2011) estimate that the expanded ARRA benefit lowered food insecurity by 2.2 
percentage points among low-income households, or about 8.8 percent on the baseline rate of 25 percent. 
18 A detailed examination of the food policy variables was carried out to explore whether the “kitchen sink” 
approach here was eliminating economic and statistical significance due to collinearity of the policy variables.  The 
short answer is no.  Sequentially adding food policy variables or combinations of food policy variables to the 
baseline set of the maximum benefit, broad-based categorical eligibility, simplified reporting, and fingerprinting did 
not alter the conclusion that most of the variables are not significant, but they do add to the model in the sense that 
some of them sharpen the effect of the four consistently significant variables.  I also examined whether stopping the 
analysis in 2006 similar to Ganong and Liebman (2013) made a difference.  The argument is that the Great 
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The next panel of Table 2 contains the estimated effects of demographic variables.  There 
is evidence that SNAP participation significantly declines with age and with education 
attainment.  White households are less likely to participate relative to African Americans and 
members of other races, as are non-Hispanics.  Conditional on the number of related children in 
the household, participation declines in household size.  Participation is also about 4 points lower 
in households that do not contain multiple generations.  Finally, participation is higher among 
female-headed households by about 4 points, and lower among married households by almost 9 
points and among those in metro areas compared to nonmetro areas.19 
[Table 3 here] 
In Table 3 I attempt to summarize the relative influence of the economy, policy and 
demographics through a series of counterfactual simulations.  Specifically I use the model 
estimates presented in column (3) of Table 2 to examine how much of the increase in SNAP 
from 2007-2011, 2000-2011, and 1980-2011 can be attributed to economic forces, changes in 
non-food policies, changes in food policies, and changes in household demographics if each of 
the four groupings was held fixed group-by-group at the values at the start of the simulation 
period.  For example, to assess the role of the economy in accounting for the increase in SNAP 
after the Great Recession from 2007-2011, I fix the unemployment rate and its lags, real median 
income, and real 90-10 income inequality at their 2007 levels and let the remaining variables 
                                                                                                                                                             
Recession may have changed the relationship between the regressors and SNAP participation.  Doing so had no 
impact on the effect of demographics or the economy on SNAP.  The before-TANF welfare variable was slightly 
stronger, and the effects of broad-based categorical eligibility and simplified reporting were weaker by stopping the 
analysis in 2006.  The only variable that changed direction is outreach spending, which becomes positive and 
significant.  None of these changes had an effect on the counterfactual simulations reported in Table 3.  
19 I also estimated unweighted versions of equation (2).  The qualitative results are unchanged, but there are some 
differences in the magnitudes a few of the coefficients. For example, the effects of median income and inequality are 
stronger in the unweighted models, as are the effects of broad-based categorical eligibility, fingerprinting, and 
simplified reporting. This has limited effect on the simulation results. Likewise I estimated models restricting 
attention to those heads with a high school diploma or less in a bid to focus on a population at ex ante greater risk of 
SNAP use.  Again, none of the qualitative results change. 
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change over time, including the year effects.  I then examine the 2000-2011 change by fixing the 
economic variables at their 2000 level, and finally the 1980-2011 change in SNAP by fixing the 
economy at the 1980 values.  This same exercise is conducted for each of the four variable 
groupings. 
From 2007-2011, the participation of households in SNAP increased 68.7 percent.  If we 
fixed the economic variables at their 2007 values, we would have predicted that SNAP 
participation would have increased only 35.8 percent.  This implies that changes in the business 
cycle and income distribution accounted for 47.8 percent (=100*(1-35.8/68.7)) of the change 
over the four-year period after the Great Recession began. While only 1.6 percent of the increase 
was due to non-food policies, a substantive 28.5 percent was due to changes in Federal and state 
food policies.  Changing demographics explain none of the increase in SNAP participation, and 
in fact, the negative number suggests that changes in demographics after 2007 actually helped 
dampen SNAP growth because caseloads were predicted to be even higher than actual. 
The middle panel of Table 3 shows that after 2000 household participation in SNAP more 
than doubled.  If the economic variables were fixed at their 2000 values then participation was 
predicted to only increase by 58.4 percent, or that the economy accounts for a sizable 45.4 
percent of the actual change in participation.  We also see that food policies have a more 
prominent role in the post-2000 period, accounting for 35 percent of the growth.  Finally, in the 
bottom panel we look back over the prior 32 years and see that changing unemployment rates 
along with the income distribution account for 37 percent of the one-third increase in SNAP 
participation.  However, food policies take center stage with a substantial 76.2 percent of the 
growth; whereas, nonfood policies such as EITC expansions and welfare reform have kept SNAP 
participation in check, as have changing demographics of the American household. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program is under the policy microscope as the 
current Congress debates whether and how to trim funding of the program in the coming decade. 
The case made to cut the program is based on concerns over the rapid growth in the past decade, 
both in terms of number of persons served and total cost.  However, the evidence presented here 
suggests that the greatest factor underlying the increase in participation after the Great 
Recession, and indeed since 2000, is the weak macroeconomy characterized by higher 
unemployment, lower incomes, and widening inequality.  The estimate that the economy 
accounts for nearly one-half of the increase from 2007-2011 is smaller than the two-thirds 
estimate reported in Ganong and Liebman (2013), most likely due to my inclusion of detailed 
controls for demographics and the income distribution which depress the effect of unemployment 
on SNAP.  Even though each study uses different samples and methodologies, however, the 
common result is that the economy is the most important factor driving short-run changes in 
participation. That is, the program is operating as intended as an automatic fiscal stabilizer 
during this extended period of economic distress facing households in the U.S.  Indeed, 
descriptive evidence points to growth in participation over the past dozen years among full-time, 
year-round workers, those with some college education, and those with household incomes 
between one and two times the federal poverty guideline. In other words, the program is 
increasingly operating as a work support for higher educated, but low-income households, not 
unlike the EITC, while still maintaining its universal entitlement to disadvantaged children and 
seniors, and the disabled. 
  The results also show that policy matters, as do demographics, especially in the long 
run.  To be sure there have been some recent changes in program eligibility such as broad-based 
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categorical eligibility and simplified reporting that have led to significant increases in SNAP 
participation over the past decade.  These programmatic changes were implemented in a bid to 
stem the tide of declining take-up rates in the late 1990s and to improve program efficiency, and 
the prime facie evidence suggests they have largely worked.  Take-up rates have rebounded to 
levels at or above those in the early 1990s (Leftin, et al. 2011), while administrative error rates 
from over-issuance and under-issuance of benefits have declined by over half since 2000.20  The 
CBO (2012) estimates that eliminating broad-based categorical eligibility as proposed in HR Bill 
1947 so that all recipients face SNAP income and asset limits will reduce SNAP participation by 
4.3 percent from 2013 to 2022. Presumably this will lead to a deterioration of program integrity, 
and to a reduction in the fraction of SNAP recipients who combine work with SNAP as those 
persons admitted by these rules tend to be the working near- poor.  In addition, the estimates 
presented suggest that the expiration of the temporary ARRA boost in benefits of 13.6 percent in 
October 2013 is predicted to reduce participation by just over 12 percent. So with continued 
improvements in the economy and return of benefits to pre-ARRA levels, SNAP participation 
should begin to fall as projected by the CBO. 
Over the long run, SNAP policies have loomed larger as a determinant of participation 
than the economy, and this is not surprising since basic program parameters and eligibility rules 
can shape the size and composition of the caseload more than in the short run.  The estimates 
here clearly point in the direction of lower participation and program cost because of the aging of 
the population, fewer children and smaller households, the ongoing shift to cities from rural 
areas, among other demographic forces.  This suggests that if policy reforms are on the horizon 
they should be framed within the context of the changing demographics of the U.S. household 
                                                 
20 Author’s calculations using total errors rates produced by the Food and Nutrition Service from SNAP Quality 
Control Data at http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/qc/pdfs/2011-rates.pdf and 
http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/qc/pdfs/2000-rates.pdf.  
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and be targeted to long-run dimensions of the program and not in response to short-run changes 
in participation.  Terminating eligibility until the recovery has had a chance to fully gain traction 
will likely be premature and expose vulnerable families to even greater economic risk. 
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DATA APPENDIX 
 The primary data source used in the analysis comes from the Annual Social and 
Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey for calendar years 1980-2011. I do not 
delete any observations for any reason, including those individuals with imputed responses by 
the Census Bureau. This results in 5,552,486 individuals residing in 2,053,018 households 
pooled across all years, or about 173,515 persons in a typical year across the sample period.  
Figures 1, 3, and 4 of the text rely on individual-level data, while Figures 2, and 5-9, along with 
Tables 2 and 3 utilize household-level information. 
 
Figure 1 in the text is the weighted fraction of the noninstitutionalized population that 
participates in SNAP, where the weight is the individual weight assigned by the Census Bureau 
that adjusts for the stratified sample design.  The Census question for SNAP receipt (HFOODSP) 
is  
“Did anyone in this household get food stamps at any time during [19XX/20XX] 
(last year)?  
where the yes/no response is assigned to all members of the household whether or not they 
receive direct assistance from the program. The unemployment rate in Figure 1 is the seasonally 
adjusted average monthly unemployment rate for individuals age 16 and older constructed by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Series ID 14000000.   
 
The assumption implicit in this paper is that if any member of the household receives 
SNAP then the entire household unit benefits because of resource pooling, which is consistent 
with the Bergson-Samuelson formulation of household utility maximization.  The Census also 
asks the following question (HNUMFS for 1980-1986; HFOODNO for 1987-2011) conditional 
on an affirmative response to SNAP receipt: 
“How many of the people now living here were covered by food stamps during 
[19XX/20XX] (last year)?” 
As a check on the trends in SNAP reported in Figure 1, in Appendix Figure 1 I show trends in 
individual-level SNAP participation rates using the ASEC alongside an adjusted ASEC series 
were I multiply each weight by the ratio of the number of SNAP Recipients to the number of 
Household Members to adjust for the fact that not all members directly receive assistance. I also 
depict a series constructed using average monthly participation in the fiscal year from FNS 
administrative data obtained from http://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/SNAPsummary.htm (the ratio of 
average monthly participation to the population estimate from the ASEC). Appendix Figure 1 
shows that from 1980 to the mid 1990s SNAP participation using the definition here results in 
higher rates relative to both administrative data and the adjusted ASEC series.  From 1996-2003, 
and again in 2008-2010, the definition here coincides with administrative rates, but there is a 
greater separation in levels of participation in the adjusted ASEC, which seems consistent with 
increased rates of under-reporting (Wheaton 2007; Meyer and Goerge 2011).  However, there are 
no substantive differences in the trends whether assigning all members to SNAP, or using the 
adjusted series, compared to trends in participation from administrative data. 
 
 Figure 2 in the text depicts trends in real household median income and inequality.  For 
this series I use total household income (which includes family income plus income, both earned 
and unearned, of nonfamily members, defined by variables HHINCTOT for 1980-1986 and 
HTOTVAL for 1987-2011) and deflate it by the personal consumption expenditure deflator 
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using 2011 as the base year obtained from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/erp2013/ERP2013_Appendix_B.pdf. 
Because all members of the household are assigned the same total income, I restrict attention to 
the 2,053,018 household heads across the sample period. For each year I construct median real 
household income, real income at the 10th percentile, and real income at the 90th percentile, and 
construct the measure of real inequality using the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentiles. 
 
 Figure 3 shows trends in SNAP participation by age category (A-AGE).  As in Figure 1, 
SNAP is determined at the household level, and thus Figure 3 reflects the participation rates of 
members of those households by age.  Figure 4 then conditions on household participation in 
SNAP and using person-level data computes the age composition of the SNAP caseload.    
 
 Figure 5 focuses on SNAP households and decomposes the caseload based on household 
size (NUM-PERS for 1980-1986; H-NUMPER for 1987-2011). 
 
 Figure 6 depicts trends in the fraction of households containing multiple generations, 
both across the entire population and conditional on SNAP status.  For each year I identify each 
unique household using the household sequence number (PPSEQNUM for 1980-1987; PH-SEQ 
for 1988-2011).  Within that household I identify that a grandchild is present if RHHDFMS = 13 
for years 1980-1987, and if HHDFMX > 22 and < 35 for years 1988-2011.  After 1986 I identify 
that a parent of the head is present if A-EXPRRP = 8 and that HHDFMX > 34 and < 46.  Prior to 
1987 there is no direct classification of a parent of head and thus I proxy this if there is an “other 
relative of head in the family” (REL-HEAD = 5 and RHHDFMS > 20 and RHHDFMS < 25) 
who is at least 15 years older than the head.  A household is multigenerational if it contains the 
parent of the adult head or a grandchild of the head. 
 
 Figure 7 presents trends in the distribution of SNAP households by employment status of 
the household head during the year prior to the survey and coinciding with the period of SNAP 
receipt (A-WEWKRS for 1980-1986, WEWKRS for 1987-2011).   
 
Figure 8 is trends in the distribution of SNAP households by education attainment of the 
head.  For the years 1980-1990 education attainment is derived by the two variables GRADE-
COM and HIGH-GRD, while for 1991-2011 it is based on A-HGA.   
 
Figure 9 depicts trends in SNAP participation by poverty status of households.  A 
household is poor if total household income (HHINCTOT for 1980-1986; HTOTVAL for 1987-
2011) is less than or equal to the poverty guideline for a given household size obtained from 
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2012/3e.html#table3.e8.   
 
Table 2 data on SNAP participation and household demographics are obtained from the 
CPS ASEC.  The state-by-year data on the unemployment rate, minimum wage, EITC 
parameters, AFDC waivers, TANF implementation, household-size specific SNAP benefits, and 
political party of the governor are obtained from the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty 
Research (UKCPR) State Welfare Database at 
http://www.ukcpr.org/EconomicData/Copy%20of%20UKCPR_National_Data_Set_07_01_13.xl
sx.  Finally the SNAP policy variables are obtained from the SNAP Policy Database assembled 
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by the Economic Research Service in the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/snap-policy-database.aspx#.UhQQ-ZLVC3I .  There are 
missing values in 2010-2011 in the main ERS database for the variables call, cap, compdq, 
reportsimple, vehexclall, vehexclamt, and vehhexclone.  For these I just assumed that the most 
recent value (0, 1, or 2 depending on variable) continued to the end of the 2011 fiscal year. The 
variables bbce_asset and oapp_esig each record a -9 as a “no” so I replaced these with 0. As 
described in the text, for policies that differ based on partial-state or full-state coverage, I 
combine the two categories into a single indicator of whether the policy is in operation in the 
state and do not distinguish coverage.  Appendix Table 1 contains the sample means of the 
variables used in the Table 2 regression models. 
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Appendix Figure 1: Comparison of SNAP Participation Rates in CPS ASEC to 
Administrative Data 
Participation (ASEC)
Participation (Admin)
Participation (ASEC-Adjusted)
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Appendix Table 1: Weighted Summary Statistics of Households  
in the CPS ASEC, 1980-2011 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
SNAP Participation 0.076 0.265 
Economy   
Unemployment Rate 0.064 0.021 
Unemployment Rate (t-1) 0.062 0.021 
Unemployment Rate (t-2) 0.061 0.019 
Median Income ($1000) 49.612 8.135 
HH Income 90-10 Ratio 8.855 1.498 
   
Nonfood Policy   
Min. Wage (Max Fed/State) 6.700 0.709 
EITC Subsidy Rate 0.123 0.129 
State has EITC 0.149 0.356 
AFDC Waiver 0.048 0.201 
TANF 0.506 0.496 
   
Food Policy   
Food Stamp/SNAP ($100) 3.493 1.465 
EBT Issuance 0.446 0.486 
Broad-based SNAP Eligibility  0.143 0.342 
Call Centers (part./full) 0.181 0.385 
Combined Applications  0.121 0.323 
Initiate by Phone (part./full) 0.079 0.269 
Short Certification  0.547 0.498 
Noncitizens SNAP-eligible 0.117 0.319 
Req. Fingerprint (part./full) 0.138 0.345 
Compulsory Disqualification  0.16 0.359 
Online App. (part./full) 0.13 0.336 
Simplified Reporting 0.284 0.444 
Vehicle Assets Excludable 0.222 0.41 
Outreach  ($100,000) 0.363 1.084 
   
Demographics   
Age 15-29 0.147 0.354 
Age 30-44 0.312 0.463 
Age 45-59 0.261 0.439 
Age 60-74 0.185 0.388 
High School Diploma 0.321 0.467 
Some College 0.237 0.425 
College 0.251 0.434 
Black 0.118 0.323 
30 
 
Other 0.042 0.201 
Hispanic 0.085 0.279 
Household Size 2.582 1.459 
Number children < 18 0.623 1.039 
Multigenerational HH 0.047 0.211 
Female 0.405 0.491 
Married 0.536 0.499 
Metro 0.784 0.412 
   
Politics   
Governor is Democrat 0.485 0.500 
   
Observations 2053018  
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Figure 1: Trends in SNAP Participation and Unemployment Rate
Recession 
SNAP (Persons as % of Pop)
Unemployment Rate
Source: Author's calculations using CPS ASEC and BLS data
32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
R
at
io
 o
f 9
0-
10
 $
20
11
 In
co
m
e
M
ed
ia
n 
$2
01
1 
In
co
m
e 
in
 T
ho
us
an
ds
Year
Figure 2: Trends in the Level and Inequality of Household Income
Median Income
90-10 Ratio
Source: Author's calculations using CPS ASEC data
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Figure 3: SNAP Participation Rates by Age of Household Member
Age < 18
18 <= Age < 60
Age >= 60
Source: Author's calculations using CPS ASEC data
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Figure 4: Trends in the Age Composition of SNAP Households
Age < 18
18 <= Age < 60
Age >= 60
Source: Author's calculations using CPS ASEC data
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Figure 5: Trends in Distribution of SNAP Households by Size
One Person
Two Person
Three or Four Person
Five or more Person
Source: Author's calculations using CPS ASEC data
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Figure 6: Trends in Multigenerational Households
Multigeneration HH
Multigeneration HH on SNAP
HH with Grandkids
SNAP HH with Grandkids
Source: Author's calculations using CPS ASEC data
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Figure 7: Trends in Distribution of SNAP Households by Employment Status of Head
Full-time, Full-year
Part-Time, Full Year
Full-time, Part-year
Part-time, Part-year
Not in Labor Force
Source: Author's calculations using CPS ASEC data
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Figure 8: Trends in Distribution of SNAP Households by Education Attainment of Head
Less than High School
High School 
Some College
College or more
Source: Author's calculations using CPS ASEC data
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Figure 9: Trends in the Distribution of SNAP Households by Income Status
HH Income <= 100% FPG
100 < HH Income <= 200% FPG
HH Income > 200% FPG
Source: Author's calculations using CPS ASEC data
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Table 1: Number of States Implementing SNAP Policy Reforms 
 Sept. 2000 Sept. 2011 
Broad-Based Categorical Eligibility  2 41 
Broad-Based Eligibility Eliminates Asset Test 2 38 
Call Centers (partial state/full state) 4/2 19/14 
Combined Applications  1 17 
Working Cases with 1-3 month Recertification 41 17 
Elderly Cases with 1-3 month Recertification 27 4 
Nonearning Cases with 1-3 month Recertification 50 26 
Compulsory Disqualification  15 18 
All SNAP Dollars Redeemed as EBT 32 51 
Initial Application by Phone (partial state/full state) 0/0 41/2 
Recertify by Phone (partial state/full state) 0/0 44/3 
Required Fingerprint (partial state/full state) 4/1 2/1 
All Noncitizen Adult SNAP-eligible 9 3 
Some Noncitizen Adult SNAP-eligible 42 48 
All Noncitizen Child SNAP-eligible 10 51 
Some Noncitizen Child SNAP-eligible 41 0 
All Noncitizen Elderly SNAP-eligible 10 5 
Some Noncitizen Elderly SNAP-eligible  41 46 
Online Application (partial state/full state) 0/0 29/1 
Online Application Digital Sig. (partial state/full state) 0 24 
Spending on Outreach Efforts 10 35 
Simplified Reporting 0 49 
All Vehicle Assets Excludable 2 45 
Vehicle Assets Limit Higher than Federal 0 2 
Vehicle Assets Excludes At Least One, Not All 2 4 
Source: SNAP Policy Database, Economic Research Service, USDA http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-
products/snap-policy-database.aspx#.Uh3oARtebmc  
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 Table 2: The Effects of the Economy, Policy, and Demographics on SNAP Participation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Economy    
Unemployment Rate 0.4108*** 0.2976*** 0.1858*** 
 (0.0458) (0.0537) (0.0679) 
Unemployment Rate (t-1)   0.0225 
   (0.0744) 
Unemployment Rate (t-2)   0.1710** 
   (0.0664) 
Median Income ($1000)  -0.0008*** -0.0007*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) 
HH Income 90-10 Ratio  0.0026*** 0.0026*** 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Nonfood Policy    
Min. Wage (Max Fed/State) -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0002 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
EITC Subsidy Rate -0.1027*** -0.1026*** -0.1026*** 
 (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0091) 
State has EITC 0.0031 0.0032 0.0028 
 (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
AFDC Waiver -0.0033 -0.0029 -0.0036 
 (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0023) 
TANF -0.0138*** -0.0111*** -0.0108*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0032) 
Food Policy    
Food Stamp/SNAP ($100) 0.0191*** 0.0191*** 0.0191*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
EBT Issuance -0.0002 0.0010 0.0008 
 (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0020) 
Broad-based SNAP Eligibility  0.0059** 0.0059** 0.0058** 
 (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
Call Centers (part./full) -0.0011 -0.0020 -0.0018 
 (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0018) 
Combined Applications  0.0010 0.0007 0.0008 
 (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0025) 
Initiate by Phone (part./full) -0.0034 -0.0021 -0.0017 
 (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
Short Certification  0.0012 0.0008 0.0005 
 (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
Noncitizens SNAP-eligible 0.0009 0.0021 0.0016 
 (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0030) 
Req. Fingerprint (part./full) -0.0042* -0.0065*** -0.0071*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
Compulsory Disqualification  0.0021 0.0011 0.0012 
 (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) 
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Online App. (part./full) 0.0011 0.0013 0.0011 
 (0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
Simplified Reporting 0.0083** 0.0074** 0.0075** 
 (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0028) 
Vehicle Assets Excludable -0.0007 -0.0013 -0.0009 
 (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
Outreach  ($100,000) -0.0017* -0.0017* -0.0016* 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Demographics    
Age 15-29 0.0712*** 0.0712*** 0.0712*** 
 (0.0075) (0.0074) (0.0074) 
Age 30-44 0.0223*** 0.0223*** 0.0223*** 
 (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) 
Age 45-59 0.0365*** 0.0366*** 0.0366*** 
 (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) 
Age 60-74 0.0337*** 0.0337*** 0.0337*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
High School Diploma -0.0873*** -0.0873*** -0.0873*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) 
Some College -0.1138*** -0.1138*** -0.1138*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) 
College -0.1361*** -0.1361*** -0.1360*** 
 (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061) 
Black 0.0969*** 0.0969*** 0.0969*** 
 (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056) 
Other Race 0.0238*** 0.0238*** 0.0238*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
Hispanic 0.0322** 0.0322** 0.0322** 
 (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0150) 
Household Size -0.0085*** -0.0085*** -0.0085*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
Number children < 18 0.0540*** 0.0539*** 0.0539*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
Multigenerational HH 0.0379*** 0.0379*** 0.0379*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) 
Female 0.0422*** 0.0421*** 0.0421*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
Married -0.0886*** -0.0886*** -0.0886*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) 
Metro -0.0185*** -0.0184*** -0.0184*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
Politics    
Governor is Democrat 0.0032*** 0.0034*** 0.0032*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
    
Observations 2053018 2053018 2053018 
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Table 3. Simulations of the Effects of the Economy, Policy, and Demographics on Changes in Household Participation in SNAP 
 
Calendar Years 2007-2011 
 
 Economy Fixed at 2007 Levels Non-Food Policies Fixed at 
2007 Levels 
Food Policies Fixed at 2007 
Levels 
Demographics Fixed at 2007 
Levels 
         
Actual 
Change (%) 
Predicted 
Change 
Share due to 
Economy 
Predicted 
Change 
Share due to 
Non-Food 
Predicted 
Change 
Share due to 
Food 
Predicted 
Change 
Share due to 
Demographics 
         
68.7 35.8 47.8 67.6 1.6 49.1 28.5 71.2 -3.7 
         
Calendar Years 2000-2011 
 
 Economy Fixed at 2000 Levels Non-Food Policies Fixed at 
2000 Levels 
Food Policies Fixed at 2000 
Levels 
Demographics Fixed at 2000 
Levels 
         
Actual 
Change (%) 
Predicted 
Change 
Share due to 
Economy 
Predicted 
Change 
Share due to 
Non-Food 
Predicted 
Change 
Share due to 
Food 
Predicted 
Change 
Share due to 
Demographics 
         
106.6 58.2 45.4 103.3 3.1 68.8 35.4 111.9 -5.0 
         
Calendar Years 1980-2011 
 
 Economy Fixed at 1980 Levels Non-Food Policies Fixed at 
1980 Levels 
Food Policies Fixed at 1980 
Levels 
Demographics Fixed at 1980 
Levels 
         
Actual 
Change (%) 
Predicted 
Change 
Share due to 
Economy 
Predicted 
Change 
Share due to 
Non-Food 
Predicted 
Change 
Share due to 
Food 
Predicted 
Change 
Share due to 
Demographics 
         
33.9 21.4 37.0 61.6 -81.5 8.1 76.2 52.9 -55.8 
         
Source: Author’s calculations based on parameter estimates in Table 2, column (3). Simulations hold identified variables fixed and 
allow others to vary over time. In each case, the year effects are allowed to vary over time. Shares do not sum to 100% since some 
factors are omitted.  
